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 Rashid Rida and Maq?sid al-Shar?a
 This article attempts to analyze the legal thought of the modern
 religious reformer Muhammad Rash?d Rida (1865-1935), particularly
 his conception of the legal aims of Islamic law (maq?sid al-shar?a).
 I argue that Rid?'s legal thought stems from his understanding of the
 maq?sid of the Qur'?n. The Lawgiver, in Rid?'s view, wants Muslims,
 whether jurists or not, to contemplate the hikma or the rationale
 behind any legal rule and to focus on the general principles of the
 sharVa> in which the consideration of the public good (maslaha)
 becomes a significant part. The article also responds to the view of few
 Western scholars' evaluations of Rid?'s legal thought such as those of
 Malcolm Kerr and Wael Hallaq.
 Introduction
 Maq?sid is the plural form oimaqsad, a term which refers to intention.
 In Islamic legal parlance, the plural maq?sid is used more often than the
 singular form, maqsad, to refer to the aims of the shan a (Islamic law),
 the intentions of the Divine Lawgiver (God).1 There are few aims of the
 shan a that are articulated in their general form in scripture such as the
 aim of "justice" mentioned in the Qur'?nic verse (16:90) which reads:
 "God commands justice, doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and
 He forbids all indecent deeds, and evil and rebellion: He instructs you,
 that you may receive admonition."2 Therefore, one can assume that
 1. The concept o? maq?sid al-shar?a might be equated with the Western notion
 of the "spirit of the law." See Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, (Ath
 ens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 56-58.
 2. The translation of Qur'anic verses in this article is mainly taken from Abdul
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 after the death of Muhammad in 632 C. E. the early Muslim com
 munity, especially the Prophet's Companions and their Successors, un
 derstood through the Qur'?nic references to the legal aims that sharVa
 laws were always purposeful and intended by the Lawgiver to achieve
 certain goals. The Qur'?nic ban on drinking grape-wine (khamr) and
 the prohibition of gambling (maysir) (Q. 5:90-91), for example, is
 followed by the reasoning that both would lead the one engaging in
 these practices to have quarrels with his or her fellow Muslims and
 would also lead to forgetting the daily prayers. But despite the clear
 indication of the legal aims and purposes of some religious laws in the
 Qur'?n, there are other legal stipulations, such as the prohibition of
 eating pork meat (Q. 2:173), where no clear reference to a legal aim is
 mentioned. Such verses might lead us to think that the early Muslim
 community understood the ultimate legal aim of the sharVa as obedi
 ence to the commands of the Lawgiver (God). Whether the purposes
 and aims of any religious law are mentioned or not, one has to follow
 the dictates of the Qur'?nic legal injunctions. But the expansion of
 the Islamic state to territories outside the Arabian Peninsula, after the
 death of the Prophet, had created many new legal cases that were not
 regulated by the Qur'?n or Prophetic traditions. In addition, if the
 Prophet's Companions succeeded during the reign of the third caliph,
 'Uthm?n b. 'Aff?n (d. 35/656), in canonizing the Qur'?nic text, the ac
 ceptance of Prophetic traditions remained controversial. This situation
 led the emerging early jurists and judges in different Islamic provinces
 to develop methods of legal reasoning in order to provide legal rules
 lor new problems.
 In the formative period of Islamic legal theory (second-fourth
 centuries, Hijn/eighth-tenth centuries, C.E.), however, a controversy
 emerged among Muslim jurists on the question of legal reasoning. The
 followers of the Z?hirite school, for example, maintained that the pur
 pose of or the reason for having the divine law could only be realized
 through the literal application of legal rules in the Qur'?n and hadlth.
 Thus the reason for having any law must be attached to its form and
 cannot be isolated as a guiding principle to be applied in new cases.
 Thus all sharVa laws must be applied literally to the cases that are
 under their direct effect. As for the new legal cases, which are not regu
 lated by the sacred texts of the Qur'?n and Prophetic traditions, they
 Iah Yusuf'Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'?n (Brentwood, Maryland: Amana
 Corporation, 1991).
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 should be regarded as outside the realm of religious obligation (kh?r
 ij d?irat al-takl?f), and therefore their legal status is "permission."3
 The followers of what we now think of as the four established Sunn?
 schools, Hanaf?te, M?likite, Sh?fi'ite and H?nbalite, agreed in principle
 on the literal application of textual rules, but they also advocated the
 use of causes or reasons behind the laws as a method for extending
 the application of textually regulated legal rules to non-textual cases.
 Among the four schools, however, the jurists' understanding of the ap
 plicability of this practice varied to a considerable degree. In general,
 the Sunn? schools use legal analogy (qiy?s) to extend the effect of a tex
 tual legal rule to include non-textual cases by sharing the same cause
 ( Via). A classic example of such analogy is the use of "intoxication" as
 Via for the prohibition of intoxicating drinks not mentioned in the
 Qur'?n or Prophetic traditions. Therefore, if drinking grape-wine is
 prohibited in the Qur'?n, date-wine becomes prohibited by analogy
 because it shares the same attribute of intoxication with grape-wine.
 Z?hirite and Shfite jurists, on the contrary, reject the use of analogy
 as a legal source.4
 While the four established Sunn? schools agreed on having four
 sources of Islamic law, namely, the Qur'?n, had?th, ijm?1 (consensus of
 the religious scholars) and qiy?s, some of them added other methods
 of legal reasoning and included them as complementary sources of
 law. Hanafite jurists, for example, used istihs?n (juristic preference) to
 rule in some new cases instead of using qiy?s.5 M?likite jurists used
 3. For the explanation of this Z?hirite view, see Ibn Hazm, al-Ihk?mfl Usul al
 Ahk?m (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1978) vol. I, pp. 10-13.
 4. Z?hirite and Shfite jurists, for example, argue that the prohibition of drinking
 date-wine can be established through the sacred texts themselves because there is a
 well-accepted Prophetic tradition which states clearly that "every intoxicating drink
 (muskir) is prohibited." Thus, there is no need to use analogy. The main argument
 of Z?hirite and Shfite jurists against the inclusion of qiy?s as a legal source stems
 from their conviction that the results of legal analogy are probable, and therefore
 cannot be included within the divine law (shar?a). While Z?hirite jurists approve
 only three sources of Islamic law, namely, the Qur'?n, had?th and ijm?\ Shfite
 jurists also include 'aql (reason) which in their interpretation amounts to rational
 decisions that are based on self-evident truths, and therefore, unlike qiy?s, can
 provide "certain" knowledge. For a detailed explanation of the role of'aql'm clas
 sical Shfite legal theory, see Muhammad Husayn Mughniyya, 7/m Us?l al-Fiqhfi
 Thawbih? al-Jadid (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1975), pp. 25-32.
 5. For a definition oiistihs?n by a Hanafite jurist, see Abu Sahl al-Sarakhs?, al
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 istihs?n and istisl?h (the consideration of a maslaha mursala, i.e. a
 benefit or utility unregulated by the texts).6 Other methods such as
 sadd al-dhar?i (closing the means to harm) and the consideration of
 (urf (local custom) were also used by some jurists as sources for legal
 ruling.
 As for incorporating the concept of maq?sid al-sharVa into the
 theoretical formulations of medieval jurists, it is clear that the legal
 aims were not considered by any school of jurisprudence as a distin
 guished legal source similar to qiy?s, istihs?n or maslaha mursala.
 However, some medieval jurists expressed a general understanding
 of the sharVa as preserving certain utilities (mas?lih) and preventing
 harms and injuries (maf?sid). One of the earliest jurists who engaged
 in this kind of discourse was Abu Hamid al-Ghazzal? (d. 505/1111).
 He developed a legal discourse in which the legal aims took a major
 part. He stated that the sharVa aims at preserving religion, life, private
 property, mind and offspring. These are, for Ghazzal?, the maq?sid of
 the sharVa. But as a Sh?fTite jurist, Ghazzal? did not accept as legiti
 mate any legal sources other than the Qur'?n, had?th, ijm?1 and qiy?s.
 Istislah can be used as a legal source only in extreme cases of necessity.7
 Another medieval jurist, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), reit
 erated Ghazzal?'s new theorization with an equal emphasis on maq?sid
 al-sharVa, but despite his Hanbalite loyalty, he acknowledged the need
 to resort to some methods other than qiy?s if the use of the latter
 would not help to achieve the purpose of the law.
 The most prominent medieval jurist who incorporated maq?sid
 al-sharVa in his legal thinking was the M?likite jurist Abu Ish?q al
 Shatib? (d. 790/1388). He developed in his al-Mu?faq?t fi Us?l al
 Usul, ed. Abu al-Wafa al-Afghan? (Cairo: Dar al-Ma rifa, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 199
 215.
 6. In classical legal theory, maslaha is usually associated with a legal source known as
 maslaha mursala (a benefit or utility unregulated by the texts). Some classic exam
 ples of the use of this source, according to some Sunn? jurists, are the collection of
 the Qur'?n by the third caliph after the Prophet, 'Uthman b. Affan and the institu
 tion of D?wan al-J und to write down the names of the combatants in the Muslim
 army by the second caliph, 'Umar b. al-Khatt?b. Although such actions were not
 mentioned in the Qur'?n or instituted by the Prophet, and therefore the utilities or
 benefits gained from them were not considered in the sacred texts, the caliphs' deci
 sions apparently indicated a consideration of those "unregulated" utilities.
 7. See Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to
 Sunn? Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 89-90.
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 SharVa, a coherent maq?sid theory based on Ghazzal?'s conception
 of maslaha. All sharl rules, according to Shatib?, aim at preserving
 specific utilities (mas?lih) that can be divided into three types accord
 ing to their religious significance. These are the indispensable (dar?ri
 yy?t), the needed (h?jiyy?t) and the utilities that achieve improvement
 (tahsiniyy?t). Preserving life, for example, is considered by Shatib? an
 indispensable utility, while the abridgment of ritual obligations under
 circumstances of hardship is considered necessary but not indispen
 sable. For the third type of utilities, the tahsiniyy?t, Shatib? considers
 performing ablution before prayer and being charitable to the poor as
 examples of such utilities. Shatib?'s aim was to show that in all textu
 ally regulated legal cases, whether in the Qur'?n or Prophetic tradi
 tions, the legal rule was instituted based on the priorities of the utili
 ties aimed by the Lawgiver. Thus, in spite of the fact that fasting the
 month of Ramadan, for example, might lead to some hardship, the
 utility of preserving religious devotion through fasting is, according to
 Shatib?, more significant than the utility of avoiding such hardship.
 Shatib?'s reference to several levels of utilities that are considered
 according to their significance in the textually-based rules raises the
 question whether non-textual legal cases must be subjected to the
 same method of comparing the significance of different kinds of utili
 ties involved. Shatib? focuses in his examples only on textual cases and
 he does not clearly call for the use of any legal methodology that is dif
 ferent from the traditional M?likite one, which incorporates maslaha
 mursala as a source used only on a limited basis after qiy?s. If this is
 true, then what kind of practical results can the use of this method
 achieve compared with, for instance, the traditional use of qiy?s or
 maslaha mursala ? These questions lie at the heart of the legal thinking
 of modern religious reformers.
 Following Shatib?'s methodology, the maq?sid reformers, such as
 Rid? and others, view the sharl a as encompassing two major parts.
 The first part represents the laws that regulate ritual practices ('ib?d?t)
 and the second part represents the laws that regulate social relations
 and economic transactions (mu amal?t). The first part has to be fixed.
 It is not developing, and no new laws are acceptable. This understand
 ing of the fixation o?'ib?d?t resonates in IbnTaymiyya's (d. 728/1327)
 dictum: l? na'bud Allah ill? bim? sham (we do not worship Allah
 except through what he has legislated).8 As for the mu amal?t, the re
 8. Taq? al-D?n Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ubi?diyya (Cairo: al-D?r al-Salafiyya, 1966), p. 11.
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 formers define these laws as intended by the Lawgiver to serve the
 utility and interest (maslaha) of Muslims in all times and places. Rules
 that are explicitly stated in the Qur'?n and Prophetic traditions are, by
 nature, based on the consideration of utility, interest, and the public
 good. Maslaha, therefore, is presented by the reformers as one of the
 greatest legal aims of the sharl a. Thus, modern Muslim jurists, the re
 formers argue, should take this fact into consideration when interpret
 ing and applying any legal rule of the sharl a, whether found in the
 sacred texts or reached through the legal reasoning of Muslim jurists.
 There is a consensus among the modern proponents of the concept
 o? maq?sid al-sharVa - coming from their Sunn? Islamic background
 - that it played a significant role in the legal interpretation of the early
 Muslim community, especially that of the four "wellguided caliphs"
 after the Prophet, and the early fuqah?' (religious scholars) such as
 Abu Han?fa (d. 150/767) and Malik b. Anas (d. 179/796).9 It is also
 embedded in the classical interpretation of Islamic law, at least as a
 trend within diverse lines of thought. Modern reformers argue, for
 example, that the concept o? maq?sid al-sharVa was very much alive
 in the legal thinking of several medieval fuqah?' such as the Hanbal
 ite jurists Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d.
 751/1350), and Najm al-D?n al-T?fi (d. 716/1316). Moreover, the
 emphasis on the role o? maq?sid al-sharVa culminated in the works
 of the M?likite jurist Abu Ish?q al-Shatib? who devoted a great part of
 his book al-Muw?faq?t to this concept.10 These jurists, according to
 the reformers' view, always took into consideration the general aims of
 the sharVa, especially the consideration of maslaha, as a main factor
 in legal rulings, even though they lived in a period characterized by
 a trend toward literalist interpretation. Many other medieval fuqah?'
 ignored the maq?sid, preferring a rigid imitation of their school's legal
 interpretation. For example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's critique of both
 the Z?hirite and later Sh?fi'ite methodologies stems from his rejection
 of the rigidity and misunderstanding of the spirit of Islamic law. The
 Z?hirites are criticized by Ibn al-Qayyim for their literal application of
 textual rules to the effect of being inconsistent with the legal aims of
 9. Most modern religious reformers refer to some of 'Umar b. al-Khatt?Vs deci
 sions as examples of a legal understanding based on the consideration o? maq?sid
 al-shan a. One of these decisions was his suspension of the textually regulated
 punishment for stealing during the "year of famine."
 10. Abu Ish?q al-SHATiB?, al-Mu?faq?t f? Us?l al-Sharia (Beirut: Dar al-Marifa,
 1975), vol. 2, pp. 10 ff.
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 the sharVa. The Sh?fi'ites, argues Ibn al-Qayyim, have used qiy?s in
 many occasions where non-textual cases are different from the textual
 ones, and therefore they do not require a legal rule based on anal
 ogy.11 Thus, according to modern reformers, the concept o? maq?sid
 al-sharVa is rooted in classical legal theory and the practical legal opin
 ions of several medieval jurists.
 As for Shatib?'s writings on the maq?sid, while some contemporary
 scholars, such as Muhammad Khalid Masud, view them as a response
 to a rigid literality in applying the sharVa, Wael Hallaq, in contrast,
 sees this interest of Shatib? in the maq?sid as a call to encourage the
 literal application of the sharVa due to the arbitrary rulings of some of
 Shatib?'s contemporary fuqah?'.n Moreover, some modern proponents
 of applying the sharVa might use many classical references to maslaha
 and maq?sid in general to respond to secular accusations that applying
 the sharVa would jeopardize Muslim interests today. It is not my aim
 in this article to check whether the medieval usage of the maq?sid was
 only a rhetorical one, adopted for apologetic purposes to encourage
 the literal application of the sharVa, or a possible reference to the legal
 aims to support their consideration in applying sharl rules, textual or
 non-textual. But it is clear that the modern movement for the con
 sideration o? maq?sid al-sharVa, represented by Rid? and others, has
 produced some legal opinions that challenge traditionalist ones, even
 in the field of textual rulings.
 An example of the modern consideration o? maq?sid al-sharVa in
 relation to a legal case that is regulated by textual rulings can be dem
 onstrated in the case of the modern abolition of slavery.13 The Muslim
 community in the early centuries of Islam and up to the modern peri
 od practiced slavery. There is no text that prohibits slavery, and in fact
 the Qur'?n and hadith contain some regulations of this practice, which
 gives an indication that the practice in itself is permitted. But most
 Muslim scholars today prohibit the practice of slavery. The reasoning
 behind this prohibition, at least according to the maq?sid thinkers, is
 that although there are some texts that refer to slavery as permitted,
 11. Ibn Qayyim al-jAWZiYYA, Tl?m al-Muwaqqiln 'an Rabb al-Alamln, ed. Muham
 mad Abd al-Ham?d (Beirut: al-Matbaa al-Asriyya, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 15-17.
 12. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abu
 Ish?qAl- Sh?tibis Life and Thought (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1977),
 p. 35; Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunn?
 Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 162-3.
 13. See Rid?'s view on slavery below in this article.
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 others encourage Muslims to free slaves. Freeing a slave is one of the
 actions that are dedicated to expiate certain kinds of sins (e.g. Q. 4:92,
 5:89, 58:3). Therefore, although there is no text that prohibits slavery,
 those scholars argue that freeing the slaves is the aim of the Lawgiver.
 The Qur'?n did not prohibit slavery due to the circumstances of the
 time, but it was only regulated to ensure the humane treatment of
 slaves and also to encourage freeing them. The modern prohibition is
 clearly based on the consideration of the intended aim of the Lawgiver,
 which is to free slaves and establish equality among human beings.
 In this example, modern scholars have reached a legal posi
 tion that is different from the traditional one by reinterpreting the
 Qur'?nic verses related to each case. Some of these verses are given
 more significance than others by representing the ultimate legal aim
 of the Lawgiver (maqs?d al-sh?ri). The legal effect of other verses
 becomes conditioned to a specific historical period and therefore
 does not apply today. It is important to notice that without the de
 termination of the presumed legal aim intended by the Lawgiver, as
 stated in specific Qur'?nic verses, other verses cannot be conditioned
 in their application.
 Western Scholarship on Rid?'s Legal Thought
 There are several studies on Rid? that focus on his intellectual project
 as representing a new movement of reform initiated by Muhammad
 'Abduh's (d. 1905) mentor Jamal al-D?n al-Afghan? (d. 1897), vis-?
 vis traditionalist thinking. These studies, however, include only a lim
 ited treatment of Rid?'s legal thought. Examples of earlier writings on
 this subject include Charles C. Adams' Islam and Modernism in Egypt
 (1933), H. A. R. Gibb's Modern Trends in Islam (1947) and J. Jomier's
 Le Commentaire coranique du Manar (1954).
 Other studies in the West of the legal thought of Rid?, which relate
 directly to the role of legal aims, have been undertaken by Malcolm
 Kerr, Albert Hourani and Wael Hallaq.14 Malcolm Kerr in his book,
 14. A recent study by David Johnston covers the legal thought of several re
 formers including Rid?. Although Johnston acknowledges the role o? maq?sid al
 shar?a in Ridas thinking, he adopts Kerr s conclusion on the role of natural law
 in Rid?'s legal interpretation. See David Johnston, A Turn in the Epistemology
 and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Us?l al-Fiqh, Islamic Law and Society
 11,2, 2004, pp. 233-282.
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 Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad (Ab
 duh and Ras hid Rid?, argues that the legal thought of both Abduh and
 Rid?, which concerns itself with concepts of utility, need and necessity,
 is influenced by the Western understanding of "natural law" and "utili
 tarianism". For Abduh, argues Kerr, "natural law is the moral code
 prescribed by the sharVa and by sound human faculties."15 "Rashi?d
 Rid?'s theories of jurisprudence," observes Kerr, "generally follow logi
 cally from Muhammad Abduh's concept of the identity of natural law
 with the sharVa. He adopted this concept as his own and built upon it
 a liberal method of legal reasoning, in which the guiding principle was
 maslaha."16 "The entire structure of substantive law arising from the
 general textual foundations is dictated [in Rid?'s thought] by human
 need, whether under the name of public interest or necessity. This
 equation of interest and necessity, put forth in such a manner as to
 make formal deductions from the revealed sources [i.e. through qiy?s]
 only a secondary confirmation of what the law should be, amounts to
 an affirmation of natural law."17
 Kerr's conclusions about the legal thought of Abduh and Rid?
 were adopted by both Albert Hourani and Wael Hallaq, but each
 took a different path in relating Abduh and Rid?'s legal thinking to
 classical Sunn? legal theory. Hourani, in his Arabic Thought in the
 Liberal Age, observes that in Abduh and Rid?'s legal thought, the
 concentration on the role of utility and the public interest in legal
 interpretation has its roots in classical legal theory and the juristic
 thinking of medieval Sunn? jurists, especially Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn
 Qayyim al-Jawziyya.18 However, Abduh and Rid?, observes Hou
 rani, go beyond their medieval masters, "at least by making explicit
 what was half-hidden in their writings." 19
 In contrast to Hourani's conclusion, Hallaq, in his A History of
 Islamic Legal Theories, claims that the modern emphasis on the role
 15. Malcolm Kerr, Islamic Reform .The Political and Legal Theories of
 Muhammad 'Abduh and Rash?d Rid? (Berkeley: University of California Press,
 1966), p. 131.
 16. Ibid., p. 187.
 17. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
 18. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939 (London:
 Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 233. It should be noted that although Hou
 ranis book appeared in press before Kerr's, Hourani had consulted Kerrs Ph.D.
 dissertation, written in 1959 on the same subject as his book.
 19. Ibid.
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 of maslaha, espoused by Abduh, Rid? and others, is a new develop
 ment not articulated by traditional jurists, including Shatib?. Only
 T?ft might be a possible representative of modern reformers' view.20
 Classical Islamic legal theory, according to Hallaq, insists on the literal
 application of legal rules found in the sacred texts. Consequently, the
 concept of maslaha, as the most significant legal aim of the sharVa, has
 limited application as a legal source, and was used only in non-textual
 cases by some of the Sunn? schools of jurisprudence. According to this
 understanding, a legal rule, approved by the Qur'?n or had?th, has to
 be applied regardless of the benefit or interest gained or lost from this
 application. The maslaha can only be achieved through the literal ap
 plication of a textual rule. This literal application represents the aim
 and intention of the Lawgiver. On the contrary, modern religious re
 formers' understanding and interpretation of Islamic law, according to
 Hallaq, are completely based on the notions of utility, public interest,
 and necessity, a utilitarian approach that runs against the classical un
 derstanding of Islamic law. Moreover, in order to achieve this utilitar
 ian interpretation, religious reformers reshaped and molded classical
 Islamic legal theory to support their view, making the law "nominally
 Islamic and dominantly utilitarian."21 In addition, "religious utilitari
 anists-Rid?, Khall?f and others-", insists Hallaq, "pay no more than
 lip service to Islamic legal values; for their ultimate frame of reference
 remains confined to the concepts of interest, need and necessity. The
 revealed texts become, in the final analysis, subservient to the impera
 tives of these concepts."22
 As stated above, it is clear that Kerr, Hourani and Hallaq deal with
 the legal aims in Rid?'s thought through the study of maslaha alone.
 It is my intention to demonstrate that the legal thought of Rid? can
 better be understood if maslaha is treated as a component of the con
 20. Najm al-D?n al-T?F?, in his treatise on a Prophetic tradition, regarded utility
 (maslaha) as the primary source of legislation. For him, even the application of
 textual rulings must follow the consideration of utility and the public good. His
 view, however, faced rejection from other medieval jurists because classical legal
 theory assigned the primacy to the sacred texts and their literal application. All
 other sources, such as the maslaha must follow textual evidence. Al-T?f?s treatise
 was published in Mustafa, Zayd, al-Maslaha f? al-Tashri al-Islam? (Cairo: Dar
 al-Fikr al-Arab?, 1964).
 21. Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunn?
 Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 224.
 22. Hallaq, p. 254.
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 cept o? maq?sid al-sharVa. The legal aims, or the maq?sid, include the
 consideration of maslaha but they are not limited by it. Also, viewing
 Rid?'s project of reform as based on the consideration of maq?sid al
 sharVa would clarify its dialectic relationship with the sacred texts,
 while looking at it from only the angle of maslaha, an extra-textual
 source, would free this project from the grip of textual evidence and
 make it appear, as Hallaq concludes, totally independent from the dic
 tates of Qur'?nic verses and Prophetic traditions. This methodological
 position necessitates treating Rid?'s legal thought through the concept
 o? maq?sid al-sharVa and not merely the maslaha.
 RID?'s Life and Contribution
 Muhammad Rash?d Rid? was born in 1865 in the Syrian village of
 Qalam?n near Tripoli, where he spent most of his childhood years.23
 He started his elementary education in a public school in Tripoli, in
 which teaching was offered in the Turkish language. Then he regis
 tered in an Arabic school, al-Wataniyya al-Islamiyya, established by
 the well-known religious scholar Husayn al-Jisr (d. 1909). Rid? recalls
 in one of his articles that he studied in this school, among other things,
 Gazzal?'s Ihya\ to which he constantly refers in his later writings. In
 1884, after Afghani and Abduh published their magazine, al-Urwa
 al-Wuthq?, in Paris, Rid? was able to read its first issues when he found
 them in al-Jisr's library. Rid? writes later in Man?r that "after reading
 al-cUrwa al-Wuthq?, I discovered a new way of understanding Islam
 and that it is not only a religion of spiritual guidance but also a com
 plete way of life."24 He also read, during those years of his education
 under the guidance of al-Jisr, the magazine al-Muqtataf which focused
 on the latest developments in science. In 1896, Rid? got his license as
 23. Rid? provides us with some accounts on his life published in his magazine,
 Majallat al-Man?r. See Muhammad Rash?d Rlp?, Majallat al-Man?r (Cairo:
 Dar A-Man?r, 1898-1935). Another Arabic source on Rid?'s life is the biography
 made by his friend Shakib Arslan, Rashid Rid? wa Ikha Arbdin 'Aman (Beirut:
 Dar al-Jil, 1955). Earliest accounts on Rid?'s life include C. C. Adams, Islam and
 Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by
 Muhammad 'Abduh (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) and J. Jomier, Le
 Commentaire coranique du Manar (Paris: G-P Maisonneuve, 1954).
 24. Rid?, Manar, vol. 19, 1916, p. 112.
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 a teacher graduating with the degree of alim (religious scholar) from
 the Wataniyya school. After his graduation, he first tried to contact
 Afghani to study with him, but after his failure to do so, he decided to
 travel to Egypt to meet Abduh. He arrived in Egypt in January 1898.
 After meeting 'Abduh, Rid? suggested to him to publish a magazine
 that advocates Afghani and ?bduh's reformist ideas. Abduh agreed
 to the suggestion, naming the magazine al-Man?r (The Sign Post).
 In the same year, 1898, the first issue of Man?r was published. Rid?
 writes later that when Man?r appeared in circulation, it followed the
 reformist line oial-Urwa al-Wuthq? except for the latter's anti-British
 tone. He also adds that he accepted Abduh's suggestion to soften the
 Man?r's political voice against the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid,
 aiming at having a more consultative system of government.25
 From 1898-1908, Rid? stayed in Egypt, but after Abd al-Hamid
 was deposed in 1909, he traveled to Istanbul, Turkey. During his visit
 to Istanbul, he met with representatives of the political organization
 that ruled Turkey, al-Ittihad wa'lTaraqqi. Moreover, he met with Shay
 kh al-Islam and discussed with him the possibility of establishing a new
 religious school in Egypt in which Rid? would teach the students ac
 cording to his reformist line of thought.26 Later in the same year, 1909,
 an Ottoman administrative order was issued to form an organization
 called Jam'iyyat al-'Ilm wa'l Irsh?d, but Rid? did not like, according
 to his account in Man?r, its administrative structure which made the
 school under the supervision of Shaykh al-Islam and affiliated with
 the Ottoman educational system.27 But his objection was not taken
 into consideration by Ottoman authorities. He later traveled to India,
 and after his return to Egypt he established an organization and school
 called Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa wa'l Irsh?d. It opened its doors to students in
 1912.28 Rid? worked for three years as the principal of the school, but
 because World War One had started and the school could not get any
 more funding from the Egyptian government, it closed in 1916. Rid?
 narrates in Man?r that while he was before the War very much against
 any attempt to abolish the Ottoman Empire, based on his pan-Islamic
 conviction inherited from Afghani and Abduh, he nevertheless found
 that after the War he believed that the best for the Arabs is to get full
 25. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 12, 1909, p. 706.
 26. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 13, 1910, p. 465.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 15, 1912, pp. 9-10.
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 independence, whether from the Turkish authorities or the occupying
 Europeans.29 He mentions that he and other Syrian dignitaries had
 sent a letter to the president of the United States asking him to help
 the Syrians to get their independence from France. He also supported
 Sharif Husayn, the Amir of Mecca, in the latter's revolt against Otto
 man authorities. Later, and until his death inl935, Rid? supported
 King Abd al- Aziz, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia.
 RiD? and Maq??id al-Shar? A
 Rid? is clearly interested in the concept o? maq?sid al-shar?a. In sev
 eral places of his writings, he refers to the maq?sid and envisions Islam
 as aiming to achieve certain goals and purposes. In his fatw?, known as
 the "fatw? on the Parisian questions," he replies to the question on the
 definition of ijtih?d and the requirements of the mujtahid. After quot
 ing from Tah?nawfs (ca. 1158/1745) Kashsh?fznd M?rghin?m's (d.
 593/1197) Hid?ya and a reference to Shatib?, Rid? states that ijtih?d,
 according to medieval jurists, is
 ? contemplating the legal sources, which are the Qur'?n, sunna,
 ijm?\ and qiy?s, and to know the detailed rules that are not found
 in the "certain" sources. The main requirement of a mujtahid is to
 be able to understand the Qur'?n and sunna, to know maq?sid al
 shar?a, and to realize peoples' life situations and customs. This
 is because the rules of the sharVa, especially in mu amal?t, de
 pend on achieving what is good for the people in this life and in
 the hereafter on the basis of the principle "preventing harm and
 bringing benefit." ? 30
 Rid? notes that after his answers to the Parisian questions were
 published in Man?r, Abduh told him that what he wrote was the best
 at explaining the principles of Islam and its maq?sid?1 In addition,
 29. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 1, 1898, p. 257.
 30. Muhammad Rash?d Rid?, Muh?war?t al-Muslih wdl-Maqallid (Cairo:
 Matbaat al-Man?r, 1906), p. 134. The Muh?war?t is structured as a dialogue
 between a young reformer (Muslih) and a traditionalist jurist (muqallid). Rid?'s
 ideas are expressed through the argumentation of the young reformer against his
 adversary.
 31. Rid?, Muh?war?t, p. 140.
 169
This content downloaded from 130.68.120.221 on Wed, 07 Nov 2018 19:06:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Yasir S. Ibrahim
 in an editorial article o? Man?r, 1899, Rid? declared, "whoever looks
 carefully at maq?sid al-shar?a, he will know that religion spreads
 through propagation and not compulsion."32
 Also, in an article entitled "Religious Reform," published in
 Man?r, 1899, Rid? asserts that "the sharVa is the guide of reform
 ers because any good for human beings, which relates to this life or
 the hereafter, has been acknowledged in Islam and regarded as one of
 its maq?sid." Moreover, in another article published in Man?r, and
 entitled al-Tashabbuh wa'l-Iqtid?', Rid? regrets that many Muslims
 during his time do not accept any kind of art or science coming from
 Europeans because they regard it as a way of imitating non-Muslims,
 an act abhorred in Islam. Rid? explains that
 ? the most important pillar to preserve religion and spread its cor
 rect teachings among non-believers is jihad, which depends on ac
 quiring such sciences. Whatever is needed to get an obligation is
 an obligatory action. But ignorance became pervasive in our time
 and fanaticism against non-Muslims without understanding and
 knowledge of maq?sid al-shar and the lack of knowing harms
 and benefits are the cause for accusing the wise people among the
 Europeans of bad intention. ? 33
 In addition to the many references of Rid? to the term maq?sid
 al-shan a or maq?sid al-shar , one can attain a better understanding
 of his maq?sid thought through his treatment of maq?sid al-Qur'?n
 found in his al-Wahy al-Muhammad?.34 Following the footsteps of
 Abduh in the latter's introduction to Tafs?r al-Man?r, Rid? assigns
 a whole chapter in his book to maq?sid al-Qur'?n. His treatment of
 the subject is far more detailed than that of Abduh. He starts the
 chapter by declaring that the maq?sid or aims of the Qur'?n are in
 tended to reform individuals and social behavior, achieve brotherhood
 and unity among peoples, and purify their souls through spirituality.35
 Then, Rid? enumerates ten maq?sid, some of which can be regarded
 as maq?sid al-shar?a because they directly relate to legal rulings. The
 first maqsad of the Qur'?n is the three pillars of belief, namely, belief in
 God, the day of resurrection, and good deeds as a proof of right belief.
 32. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 1, p. 765.
 33. Rid?, Man?r, vol. 1, p. 554.
 34. Rid?, al-Wahy al-Muhammad? (Cairo: Waz?rat al-Awq?f, 2000).
 35. Rid?, Wahy, p. 124.
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 The second maqsad is to prove prophecy in general and the miracles
 of prophets in particular. The third maqsad is to purify and perfect the
 human soul and personality. This can be achieved through the call for
 hikma, which, according to Rid?, is synonymous with practical philos
 ophy and psychology, ethics, and the general rules of social relations.
 Rid? defines hikma as "to know something according to its essence
 and what it has of benefits that inspire action." He says that the word
 fiqh in the Qur'?n refers to hikma and not to the juristic meaning of
 specific rules of practice.36 The third maqsad also includes the Qur'?n's
 instruction about independent reasoning and its disparagement of
 taql?d. Rid? notes that while European educational systems emphasize
 the role of independent reasoning and logical thinking, only few Mus
 lims, including the 'ulama', practice Islam in away that reflects its real
 "rational picture."37
 The fourth maqsad of the Qur'?n is to call for social and political
 reform in a way that leads nations to unity and equality. The other
 form of unity is a legal one in which Rid? envisions all those under
 Islamic rule would be equal in their civil rights according to the prin
 ciple of justice among believers and non-believers, rich and poor, and
 a ruler and ordinary people.38 Also, Rid? includes within this maqsad
 an understanding that the places of worship of non-Muslims living
 under Islamic rule must be respected and no one should enter such
 places without the consent of the people in charge. In addition, the
 fourth maqsad of the Qur'?n also encompasses the principle of judicial
 independence and the equality of all people in front of the just sharVa.
 But Rid? notes that legal cases pertaining to non-Muslims that relate
 to personal and family matters must be excluded from the influence
 of Islamic courts, and must be judged by the leaders of each religious
 community, according to their religious traditions. But if such people
 decided to litigate in front of a Muslim judge, then the sharVa must
 be applied. Rid? refers here to Q. 5:42, 48, and 49.39
 The fifth maqsad is titled, "the general features of Islam in the field
 of personal obligations and prohibitions." Rid? enumerates within this
 maqsad ten rules, many of which deal directly with legal theory. First,
 based on Q. 2:143, Islam stands in the middle of all religious tradi
 36. Rid?, Wahy, p. 184.
 37. Rid?, Wahy, p. 188.
 38. Rid?, Wahy, p. 193.
 39. Rid?, Wahy, p. 194. The verse (5:48) reads, "So judge between them (non
 muslims) by what God hath revealed..."
 171
This content downloaded from 130.68.120.221 on Wed, 07 Nov 2018 19:06:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Yasir S. Ibrahim
 tions in terms of its balance between the right of the soul and that of
 the body, and the good in this life and in the hereafter.40 Second, the
 objective of Islam is to help human beings to achieve happiness in
 this life and in the hereafter through spiritual purification, right belief,
 good deeds, and ethical behavior. The third rule is that the aim of Is
 lam is to call on human beings to know each other and establish good
 relationships. The fourth rule is that Islam is a religion of easiness and
 does not call for hardship in religious practices. He refers to Q. 2:286,
 2:220, 2:185, 22:27, and 5:7. One of the results of this general rule is
 that "a religious obligation which causes hardship would be mitigated
 into either a less difficult obligation or totally cancelled, such as fast
 ing the month of Ramadan for the one who suffers from a long-term
 illness. In such a case, the ill person can feed a poor person each day
 in Ramadan as a substitute for fasting."41 As for a prohibited action,
 Rid? adds, it can be permitted in cases of necessity, as clearly stated
 in the Qur'?n. If the prohibition is based on the principle of "closing
 the means to harm," then it can be permitted in cases of extreme need
 (h?ja) and not only necessity. The fifth rule, included within the fifth
 maqsad, prohibits perceiving religion as a way of self-torture by deny
 ing what God has permitted. This is based on Q. 7:31.42 The sixth
 rule is that Islam has only a few religious obligations and they can
 be easily understood. But traditional jurists increased religious obliga
 tions through their opinions, so that knowing all such rules became
 difficult, and practicing all of them was impossible. Rid? gives exam
 ples of daily prayers and the ablution before prayer to argue that such
 practices can be easily learned without difficulty.43 The seventh rule is
 that religious obligation can be divided into obligations Caz?'im) and
 mitigations (rukhas). Ibn 'Abb?s (d. 68/687) used to prefer mitiga
 tions while Ibn 'Umar (d. 73/692) preferred obligations. Rid? refers to
 Q. 35:32 which enumerates three kinds of believers according to their
 degrees of commitment to religious practices.44 The eighth rule states
 that the texts of the Qur'?n and sunna have degrees of authenticity.
 Whatever is "certain" in these texts is considered the general frame
 40. Rid?, Wahy, p. 198.
 41. Rid?, Wahy, p. 199.
 42. Q. 7:31 reads, "O children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every
 time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess, for God loveth
 not the wasters."
 43. Rid?, Wahy, p. 200.
 44. Rid?, Wahy, p. 201.
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 work of religious knowledge. Whatever is "probable" in its authentic
 ity or meaning allows degrees of interpretations. The Prophet in such
 cases of possible multiplicity of meaning used to acknowledge all the
 opinions of his Companions. When the Qur'?nic verse in the second
 s?ra (2:219) was revealed, and it mentioned the harm in drinking
 wine without clear prohibition, some Companions quit drinking wine
 while others continued. The Prophet accepted both positions until the
 verse in the fifth s?ra (5: 90) was revealed, which clearly prohibited
 such practice. Rid? explains that religious obligations and prohibitions
 cannot be authenticated except through "certain" texts that are under
 stood by everyone. The Qur'?nic verses that have "uncertain" meanings
 and isolated hadlths, whether in their chains of authorities or mean
 ings, depend in their application on whether they are accepted or not
 by specific jurists and on the ijtih?d of decision-making people in the
 field of judicial rulings and political matters.45 The ninth rule is that
 no one shall be punished for what is in his or her heart or mind. Pun
 ishments are exclusively applied in cases of specific crimes or infringe
 ments on practical rules related to the public good and rights. The
 last rule, included in the fifth maqsad, states that religious rituals are
 decided according to what we know of the Prophet's practice, and no
 one can add or change them according to one's personal preference.
 These rituals have the goals of spiritual purification and remembrance
 of God. Rid? concludes, after enumerating the ten rules, that each one
 of them is liable to be regarded as a special maqsad of the maq?sid of
 revelation.46
 It is clear that the ten rules that compose the fifth maqsad of the
 Qur'?n present a general understanding of the sharVa according to
 Rid?'s view. The remaining five maq?sid deal with the general rules
 that pertain to specific fields of legal activity, namely, political and in
 ternational, financial, warfare and peace making, the status of women
 and their rights, and slavery.
 The sixth maqsad of the Qur'?n is entitled, "Explaining Islamic
 political and international rule: its kind and general principles." There
 are several rules and principles that pertain to this topic. Rid? notes
 that the first fundamental rule of Islamic government is that the per
 son who heads the government in Islamic society, whether called an
 im?m or caliph, is entitled to execute the sharVa. The umma has the
 45. Rid?, Wahy, p. 201.
 46. Rid?, Wahy, p. 202.
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 right to appoint him and remove him from office. Rid? quotes Q. 42:
 38 and 3:159 to support his view.47 The Prophet, Rid? argues, used to
 consult with his Companions in matters pertaining to political, mili
 tary, and financial affairs that were not regulated in the Qur'?n. The
 wisdom behind calling for practicing sh?r? in a general way is to allow
 Muslims to choose the best method, according to their time and place,
 that achieves the goal of consultation.48 Rid? continues his discussion
 by noting that one of many religious proofs that political and judicial
 legislation is the right of the umma is that the Qur'?n, when speaking
 on such matters, always addresses the Muslim community at large.
 Such references are found, for example, in the first verse of the ninth
 s?ra, which reads, "A (declaration) of immunity from God and His
 Messenger to those of the..." and Q. 49:9 which reads, "If two parties
 among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them:
 but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then
 fight ..." Such a reference to the community at large is also found in
 the verses that address the rules related to properties, booty, and the
 status of women.49 Rid? adds that some great legal theorists declared
 that sovereignty in the Islamic state is the right of the umma through
 the role of the ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd, who should be responsible for
 appointing caliphs and imams or remove them from office if the pub
 lic good requires such a decision. Imam Raz? (d. 606/1210) defined
 khilafa as "general leadership given to one person according to specific
 conditions."
 Raz? stated in the last condition that the "umma has the right to
 remove the imam from office due to mischief." Moreover, al-Sa'd al
 Taftazan? (d. 793/1390) said in his Sharh al-Maq?sid as a commentary
 on Raz?'s definition, "what he meant by the umma is the ahl al-hall
 wa'l-'aqd." Rid? observes that such a basic rule of the Islamic state is
 the greatest political reform which the Qur'?n declared in a time when
 all nations were enslaved by tyrannical governments. This rule was
 applied first by the Prophet and then by the four well-guided caliphs.
 Rid? adds that the Qur'?n describes how the Queen of Sheba consulted
 with her people to bring an example of the best policy.50 But some me
 47. Q. 42:38, for example, reads, "Those who harken to their Lord, and establish
 regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation..."
 48. Rid?, Wahy, p. 202.
 49. Rid?, Wahy, p. 203.
 50. The reference here is to Q. 27:32 in which the Queen said, "Ye chiefs! Advise
 me in my affair: no affair have I decided except in your presence."
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 dieval jurists, Rid? observes, made sh?r? only recommended, without
 any obligatory status, to satisfy the will of kings and princes.51
 The second principle that relates to the sixth maqsad encompass
 es the "fundamentals of legislation in Islam." Here, Rid? repeats his
 dominant idea that after consulting the three main sources of Islamic
 law, namely, Qur'?n, sunna, and ijm?\ rules that pertain to political
 activities can be achieved through ijtih?d. However, Rid? quotes for
 the first time in his Wahy a had?th in which the Prophet said to one of
 his military commanders, "If you surround a fortress, and the people
 inside ask you to rule according to God's law, do not do that, but ap
 ply your own judgment, because you do not know if you can achieve
 treating them in accordance with God's law or not." Rid? comments
 on the had?th that this is one of the clearest had?ths that gives the right
 to make decisions in political and military affairs to the caliphs and
 leaders because they are part of the general benefits (mas?lih amma)
 that change according to time and place.
 Then, Rid? adds an important paragraph in which he divides the
 legal rulings of the Qur'?n and sunna into two categories. First, are
 rulings that deal with specific actions and events. These are com
 posed of two types. First are rules that have a "certain" quality in
 terms of their authenticity and meaning, and therefore do not allow
 any ijtih?d and must be applied unless there is a shar? reason to
 prevent such an application. Examples of such exceptional reasons
 are the lack of a condition necessary for applying the rule such as
 abandoning the application of a Qur'?nic rule of punishment (hadd)
 due to doubt or a case of necessity. Here Rid? brings again the ex
 ample of 'Umar's decision not to apply the hadd for thieves during
 the year of famine. The other type of specific rulings, mentioned in
 the Qur'?n and Prophetic traditions, include rules that have only
 "probable" quality in terms of either authenticity or meaning. Those
 are applied according to the ijtih?d of the decision-making people as
 described before.
 Rid? introduces in this section of Wahy, for the first time, the sec
 ond category of Qur'?nic and Prophetic rules. These are described as
 "general rules" of all legal rulings. The most important of them are
 the search for truth and justice; equality in rights, testimonies, and
 rulings; the preservation of mas?lih and prevention of maf?sid; the
 consideration of local custom ?urf) according to its conditions; the
 51. Rid?, Wahy, p. 204.
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 abandonment of applying hud?d in cases of doubt; necessities permit
 prohibitions; necessity has to be determined according to its condi
 tions; the main aim of mu amal?t is gaining virtues and avoiding vices;
 and lastly the prohibition of injustice.52 It will be more clear through
 Rid?'s legal opinions and fatw?s that the kind of free ijtih?d that he
 envisions in the field of mu amal?t is very much directed by such gen
 eral rulings that he enlists as part of the maq?sid of the Qur'?n. Rid?,
 however, covers only a few of those general rules in his treatment of
 the sixth maqsad. He quotes Qur'?nic verses that call for achieving
 justice and equality when judging between people and also the prohi
 bition of injustice.53 But he elaborates on the rule, which states "the
 aim of the mu amal?t is to achieve virtues and prevent vices." Rid?
 declares, "Whoever uses induction (istiqr?') in studying the rulings of
 the sharVa finds that all rules, mentioned in the Qur'?n or the sunna,
 whether related to personal, civil, political, or military matters, are
 aimed at the achievement of the goals of truth, justice, trust, keeping
 promises, mercy, love, tranquility and avoiding injustice, lying, mis
 trust, usury (riba), and bribery."54
 After stating the specific and general rules of the sharVa, Rid?
 claims that penal laws in Islam are constituted of two kinds. First are
 the hud?d, which means the obligation to apply a specific punish
 ment for a specific crime according to the text, such as the execution
 of murderers to keep the life of the community, the punishment of
 adultery to preserve the family honor and progeny, the punishment
 for stealing to preserve security, and the punishment for intoxication
 to preserve the mind. Rid? explains that some jurists do not regard
 the punishment for intoxication as a hadd because it is not mentioned
 in the Qur'?n and not determined in the sunna. The wisdom behind
 applying the hud?d, Rid? observes, is to deter criminals and other non
 virtuous people. But in the case of punishment for adultery, Rid? com
 ments that jurists made conditions to apply the hadd, which rarely can
 be achieved except through confession. It is also narrated in a had?th
 that the one who commits adultery should hide his problem and he or
 she is not encouraged to confess. In the end, Rid? notes that the appli
 cation o? hud?d is the right of the caliph or the im?m, and no one else
 can apply such penal laws. The second type of criminal laws are those
 52. Rip?,W*/rv,p.210.
 53. Rid?, Wahy, p. 210.
 54. Ibid.
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 called ta'z?r (disciplinary punishment), which depend solely on the
 ijtih?d of rulers, in the light of the general rules mentioned above.
 The seventh maqsad of the Qur'?n is related to "directions toward
 financial reform." Rid? argues that this maqsad deals with one of the
 major social problems which is "the tyranny of wealth." The other
 three social injustices are: "the aggression of war and its severity," "the
 injustice against woman," and "the injustice against the weak and cap
 tives by denying their freedom." For each of these four social ills, Rid?
 dedicates a separate maqsad. The main general rules or principles re
 lated to financial reform are encouraging spending for the sake of God
 to support the poor; being wise in spending; the protection of private
 property; the obligation to pay the zak?t (alms giving); the obligation
 to spend on one's wife and family; and spending on the poor as an
 obligation to expiate one's sins. Rid? quotes Qur'?nic verses to support
 his claim that all these principles are declared in the Qur'?n. What is
 more related to our topic, however, is that Rid? regards those princi
 ples or general rules as part of the maq?sid of the Qur'?n through his
 quotations of verses that deal with specific questions. For example, he
 quotes Q. 65:7, which reads, "Let the man of means spend according
 to what God has given him." Rid? argues that although this verse was
 revealed to deal with the question of spending on the divorced wife
 during her grace period ?idda), the instruction is general. He refers
 to a principle in Islamic legal theory which states that "the main refer
 ence in any verse is to the general meaning and not just to the specific
 reason of revelation."55 Rid? also declares that if one does not interpret
 Qur'?nic instructions on financial matters according to their hikam,
 HllaU and benefits, God's word would not be called hikma. Rid? quotes
 Q. 17:29 which reads, "Make not thy hand tied (like a niggard's) to
 thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that thou become
 blameworthy and destitute," and comments that God made the reason
 for the negative value of spending without limits the end result of such
 action, which is to be blameworthy and destitute.
 Therefore, Rid?, following the footsteps of Abduh, finds that
 Qur'?nic verses cannot be called "words of wisdom" (hikma) unless
 they refer to general principles that guide humanity as well as to the
 aims or purposes of legal rules. But a legitimate objection to Rid?'s
 principles of financial reform, included within the seventh maqsad,
 is that most of them do not constitute specific rulings that can bring
 55. Rid?, W?%,p. 221.
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 change and achieve real reform in Muslim societies. This objection,
 which is related to Rid?'s maq?sid thought in general, as portrayed in
 al-Wahy al-Muhammad?, will be checked through his fatw?s to see if
 such general rules and principles can in fact generate legal opinions on
 specific questions.
 In the eighth maqsad, Rid? deals with the "reformation of the
 warfare system and the prevention of its vices and conditioning its
 legitimacy on what brings benefit to humanity." The subtitle of this
 maqsad is "a general outlook at the philosophy of warfare, peace mak
 ing, and treaties." It is clear from the title and the subtitle that the
 main topic of this maqsad is more specific than the previous one. One
 can clearly note that Rid?'s writings on this topic reflect the events
 of his day, mainly the post-World War One colonization of Muslim
 countries by European powers. He declares first that if warfare reflects
 a struggle to achieve justice and bring good to people, then it can be
 legitimized according to the Qur'?n. But if it aims at the occupation
 of other nations and the oppression of the weak by the strong, as
 the European powers did, then warfare must be stopped because it
 is unjust. In addition, he notes that the aim of peace treaties should
 be achieving reform, justice, and equality among people and not the
 domination of one nation over the other. He cites the treaty of Ver
 sailles, after World War One, as an example of an ill-advised treaty.
 Then, Rid? states what he calls "the most important rules of warfare
 and peacemaking in Islam." These rules are the following. The first
 rule permits fighting aggressors in order to stop their aggression, but
 prohibits Muslims from starting any aggression against non-Muslims.
 Rid? quotes Q. 2:190, which reads, "Fight in the cause of God those
 who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not trans
 gressors," and comments that this verse is muhkam (clear in mean
 ing) and cannot be abrogated. The Prophet's wars were defensive in
 nature. Second, the positive aim of fighting in Islam, after facing ag
 gression and injustice, is the protection of the followers of all religions
 from being oppressed or compelled to convert to another religion.
 Rid? cites Q. 22: 39-40, which read, "To those against whom war is
 made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged-and
 verily, God is most powerful for their aid. (They are) those who have
 been expelled from their homes in defiance of right- (for no cause)
 except that they say, 'Our Lord is God.' Had not God checked one set
 of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled
 down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the
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 name of God is commemorated in abundant measure..." Third, peace
 is the original state of relationships between nations, and warfare is
 only a necessity that might be conducted to achieve good and pre
 vent injustice. Rid? cites Q. 8:61 which reads, "But if the enemy
 inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust
 in God...", to prove that peace is preferred over war. Fourth, the per
 fect preparation for the war should be in a way that might prevent it.
 The fifth rule is entitled "Mercy with Captives." Rid? cites Q. 76:8
 stating, "And they feed for the love of God the indigent, the orphan,
 and the captive."56 The sixth rule is "fulfilling the obligations of trea
 ties without any violations." Here Rid? cites Q. 16:91, which states,
 "Fulfill the covenant of God when ye have entered into it, and break
 not your oaths after ye have confirmed them..." The seventh and last
 rule, related to the eighth maqsad of the Qur'?n, states that "the poll
 tax (jizya) is a consequence to fighting and not a cause." Rid? com
 ments on Q. 9:29, which reads, "Fight those who believe not in God
 nor the last day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden
 by God and His messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of truth,
 from among the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with
 willing submission, and feel themselves subdued..." He argues that
 this verse calls on Muslims to fight those mentioned when there is a
 legitimate reason to do so, such as an aggression against them or their
 country, or oppressing them and denying religious freedom to Mus
 lims. This is the case of the Byzantines against Muslims during the
 time of the Prophet and leading to the battle of Tab?k, with which
 the verse is dealing.57 The poll tax was instituted in such cases to en
 sure first the security of Muslims and also to place an obligation on
 them to protect and defend the People of the Book who paid the poll
 tax. Rid? adds that the hikma of the jizya is that it was not a tax of
 conquerors on the conquered people in order to subjugate them un
 der their will. Rather, it is an obligation on Muslims to defend against
 any aggression those non-Muslims who paid the poll tax. "This is well
 known from the behavior of the Prophet's Companions who were the
 most knowledgeable of maq?sid al-shar?a and the most just in apply
 ing them."58 He cites some examples from Baladhur?'s (d. 279/892)
 Fut?h al-Buld?n and Azd?'s (c. 165/782) Fut?h al-Sh?m in which the
 56. Rid?, Wahy, p. 233.
 57. Rid?, Wahy, p. 234.
 58. Ibid.
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 Companions gave back the amount of the poll tax taken from the
 People of Hims because the Muslims could not protect them from
 the Byzantines during the battle of Yarm?k. Therefore, Rid? observes,
 warfare in Islam is limited to preventing harm and achieving good for
 human beings. As for the non-Muslim states with whom the Islamic
 state has peace treaties, they are called ahl al-ahd and the peace ar
 rangement must be fulfilled.
 The ninth maqsad of the Qur'?n is "giving women all human, re
 ligious, and civil rights." Rid? emphasizes in this maqsad the right of
 women to acquire and manage properties, their rights in dowry and
 inheritance, and their complete independence in representing them
 selves in courts. All these rights are compared to the status of Arab
 women before Islam. Rid? adds that although Islam placed the right of
 divorce in the hand of the husband, it also gave the right to the woman
 to condition her marriage contract with the right of initiating divorce
 if she wanted. This is based on the opinion of some jurists that any
 condition (shart) in a contract is a legitimate one unless it contradicts
 a "certain" text in the Qur'?n or sunna.59
 The tenth maqsad is entitled "The emancipation of slaves." Rid?
 argues that the sharVa ensured the just treatment of slaves during the
 time of the Prophet, and included rules that can gradually lead to the
 abolition of slavery. The way to do that was first to limit slavery to
 war captives with the encouragement to free them, and second, the
 gradual emancipation of the old slaves. This is clear in the actions of
 the Prophet during and after the battles of Ban? al-Mustalaq, Fath
 Mecca, and Ghazwat Hunayn. In those three military exhibitions, Rid?
 notes, the Muslims were victorious, and the Prophet's wish to free the
 war captives showed that "the spirit of the sharVa calls for the freedom
 of slave captives without any gain for Muslims except doing a good
 deed."60 Based on this spirit, Rid? enlists several cases in which Islamic
 law ensures the freedom of slaves and regards this action as a religious
 act of devotion to God. In several cases of expiation of certain sins, the
 Qur'?n prescribes freeing slaves as either an obligatory or an optional
 act to fulfill this expiation.61
 Rid?'s maq?sid thought in al-Wahy al-Muhammad? presents a gen
 eral outlook on the sharVa in which principles and general rules are
 59. Rid?, Wahy, p. 234.
 60. Rid?, Wahy, p. 246.
 61. See, for example, Q. 58:3 and 4:92.
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 mentioned and authenticated as "certain" by virtue of their Qur'?nic
 origin. All rulings on mu amal?t have to achieve the goal of being
 in line with such general rules and guiding principles. Rid?'s method
 of formulating such principles follows 'Abduh's in first the thematic
 character of dealing with each question of inquiry by collecting all
 or most of Qur'?nic verses on the subject, and second through the
 concentration on the hikma of any Qur'?nic rule. The phrases in such
 Qur'?nic verses that focus on the rationale behind having the rules
 are emphasized in the interpretive process and then generalized into
 guiding principles or rules of action. In addition, Rid? presents in his
 writings on maq?sid al-Qur'?n a new genre of religious writings, prac
 ticed mostly by later maq?sid thinkers, in which different sections of
 fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, are introduced by an enumeration and
 elaboration on the main maq?sid of the sharVa that relate to the spe
 cific section, such as financial, political, etc. However, it remains worth
 attempting to see if such theorization can be translated into a practical
 effect in Rid?'s fatw?s, but at least one can confidently declare such
 an effect in his writing on maq?sid al-Qur'?n, such as in the cases of
 slavery and warfare and peacemaking in Islam.
 Rid?'s Fatw?s
 Rid?'s fatw?s appeared as a special section in his Man?r, from 1903 to
 1935, to answer questions on different topics of Islamic jurisprudence.
 According to al-Munajjid and Kh?r?, who published Rid?'s fatw?s in
 six volumes, the latter issued 1061 fatw?s in the Man?r.62 Some of
 these, for sure, are questions about Rid?'s opinions on matters related
 to dogmatics, reason and revelation in Islam, how to achieve Muslim
 unity and the like. That is why Rid? did not name this section in the
 Man?r as dedicated for fatw?s in the early issues but rather a section
 for "questions and fatw?s." However, in his fourteenth issue of the
 seventh volume of the Man?r, he named the section ub?b al-fatw?"
 (the section on fatw?). Thus, not all the 1061 entries, which are listed
 in Rid?'s Fat?w?, deal with legal questions. In addition, to know the
 limits of Rid?'s fatw?s and their degree of technicality, he explains in
 his fatw? on "the fundamentals of Islam," dated 1926, that the aim of
 the section on fatw?s in the Man?r is to provide concise answers to
 62. Muhammad Rashid Rid?, Fat?w? al-Im?m Muhammad Rashld Rid?, Salah
 al-D?n al-Munajjid and Yusuf Khiir?, eds. (Beirut: Dar al-Kit?b al-Jad?d, 1970).
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 legal questions and to decline from delving into very detailed points of
 Islamic jurisprudence. 63 Since Rid?, throughout his fatw?s, refers his
 readers to his theoretical works, published first periodically in Man?r,
 such as Yusr al-Islam, Muh?war?t, and Khilafa, he undoubtedly ex
 pects the inquirer to get a more detailed answer to the theoretical part
 of his question in such works.
 In fatw? 685, dated 1926, Rid? asserts that "civil and political rul
 ings must be based on the prevention of harms and the preservation
 of the public good. The judicial rulings must be based on justice and
 equality, and the obligation to preserve religion, life, mind, property,
 and honor."64 In fatw? 201, dated 1906, Rid? argues that the aim
 of mu amal?t rulings is to prevent injustice from being committed
 among people.65 He also states in fatw? 243, dated 1907, that "the
 pillars of judgeship and political rule in Islam are the Qur'?n, sunna,
 ijtih?d, and consultation. These are based on the maxim: preventing
 the maf?sid and preserving the mas?lih."66 In addition, in fatw? 304,
 dated 1909, Rid? writes that "on questions related to worldly affairs
 in mu amal?t, the jurist should not look only to the literal meanings
 (Zaw?hir) of the Qur'?n and sunna but also to analyzing the cases in
 question, to know their actual circumstances, by using induction and
 research."67 Here, it becomes clear that Rid?'s call for the considera
 tion o? maq?sid al-shar?a in mu amal?t in this fatw? is translated into
 a clear reference to the "spirit" of Islamic law that might be realized
 through a non-literal sense of textual meanings. Thus, Rid?'s method
 ology in mu amal?t, through his consideration o? maq?sid al-shar?a,
 is not limited to using maslaha mursala as the main tool to achieve his
 goal. First, some of his fatw?s on mu amal?t are based on his specific
 interpretation of Qur'?nic or had?th texts in which the aim of the legal
 rule becomes the central focus in his decision. Second, in his response
 to several questions that lie outside the realm of textual evidence, he
 not only employs the principle of maslaha mursala but also sadd al
 dhar?i (closing the means to harm) to actualize the maxim of daf
 al-maf?sid, which is considered one o? maq?sid al-shar?a.
 63. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 5, p. 1871.
 64. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 5, p. 1873. These five mas?lih are considered by Shatib?
 as the necessary ones which the sharVa strives to preserve. See Shatib?'s Muafaqat,
 vol. 2, pp. 9 ff.
 65. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 2, p. 527.
 66. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 2, p. 627.
 67. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 3, p. 838.
 182
This content downloaded from 130.68.120.221 on Wed, 07 Nov 2018 19:06:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Rashid Rida and Maq?sid al-Shari'a
 Examples of cases in which Rid? clearly interprets the texts in a
 way that focuses on the legal aims are the fatw?s on the prohibition of
 using gold and silver plates and ornaments; eating the meat of animals
 slaughtered by the People of the Book; the question of bank interest
 and the prohibition of usury; making statues and paintings of hu
 man and animal forms; using alcohol for medical reasons; accepting
 evidence in court based on a telegraphic message; listening to singing
 and music; the prohibition of gambling; the dissolution of marriage
 contracts due to a physical or mental defect of the husband or wife.
 On the Prohibition of Using Gold and Silver
 Plates and Ornaments
 Several questions addressed to Rid? in the fatw?s section of Man?r
 relate to the well-known prohibition of using gold and silver plates.68
 The narrated had?ths, most of them accepted by all schools, pro
 hibit men to wear gold ornaments. There are also had?ths that allow
 men to wear silver ornaments, and others that prohibit the use of
 gold and silver utensils (?niya). Some of the questions that appear in
 the fatw?s enquire about the prohibition itself, and Rid? responds
 clearly with listing such had?ths, calling for their literal application.
 But when Rid? is asked about cases such as whether it is permitted
 for the Islamic state to use gold or silver medals to praise civil or
 military servants, or whether a Muslim can eat from a gold or silver
 plate offered in the house of the People of the Book, his response is
 very much influenced by his consideration of the maq?sid of such
 prohibitions. In fatw? 608, dated 1923,69 Rid? responds to the ques
 tions of using gold and silver utensils or wearing gold medals (or
 silver watches), by declaring first that even if a jurist can use qiy?s to
 argue that the Hila in the prohibition of using gold and silver utensils
 is the same in using gold and silver medals, and consequently the va
 lidity of this qiy?s, Z?hirite jurists and some Traditionists concluded
 that no religious prohibition can be reached through qiy?s. In other
 words, Rid? is saying that even if qiy?s in such cases is valid, we will
 end up with a prohibition or disliked action which cannot be includ
 68. See, for example, Ibn Qud?ma al-MAQDis?, al-Mughn? (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr,
 1983) vol. 2, pp. 169-171.
 69. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, p. 1635.
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 ed within the category of "har?m" since religious prohibition has to
 be indicated through "certain" texts and not through human ijtih?d.
 Although the end result of such distinction will be the same in the
 sense that such an action will still be prohibited, the lack of religious
 character of the prohibition can make room for the consideration of
 maslaha when it is relevant to do so.
 But Rid?, in relation to this question, does not stop at attacking
 the "religious" content of qiy?s. Rather, he looks into the reason
 for the prohibition and concludes that it is to avoid an extravagant
 way of life. In fatw? 76, published in the Man?r, 1904, Rid?, after
 enlisting some of the juristic opinions on the Hila of the prohibition,
 declares that
 ? the had?th which shows that using gold and silver is the feature
 of the People of Paradise indicate that the Muslim is prohibited
 from a lavish and extravagant way of life until he or she ignores
 their religious obligations and is in a state of weakness in the face
 of his/her enemies. This extravagant way of life causes the decay
 of nations and the destruction of cities, and it is the Hila of injus
 tice, mischief, and the instigation of quarrels and transgression
 among people. ?
 Rid? adds that if this is the Hila o? the prohibition, then it is not
 a "religious" prohibition that must be extended to any kind of use.
 Thus, if a Muslim drinks from a gold or silver ustensil in the home of a
 non-believer, or even a Muslim, without intending to mimic such way
 of life, his action does not violate a religious prohibition.70 But how
 can one decide if a certain use of gold or silver commodities is lavish or
 not? For Rid? this depends on the customs in each society. If a society
 is very poor, then most of such uses would be regarded as lavish. This
 was the reason for the Sh?fi'ite jurists to prohibit any kind of use ex
 cept what is stated in Prophetic traditions. Rid? also observes that the
 modern scholars of political economy studied the effect of manufac
 turing plates, furniture, etc. for aesthetic purposes and whether there
 is any harm in doing so. They found that societies can benefit from
 such kind of production because it is a way for rich people to spend
 their money and this creates vocations for less fortunate people. This
 is the kind of benefit that the people call kam?liyy?t and Shatib? in
 Mu?faq?t calls tahs?niyyat. Therefore, there is a maslaha for the umma
 70. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, p. 189.
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 (the Muslim community) in having gold or silver commodities but on
 the condition that it must be within the ethical framework. But Rid?
 concludes that for precautionary reasons, it is better for the Muslim
 to avoid the kind of use clearly mentioned in the had?ths and con
 sider the maslaha elsewhere.71 In fatw? 117, published in the Man?r,
 1904, Rid? responds to the question of medals, especially gold or silver
 ones. He argues that this practice was not mentioned in the sunna,
 and therefore its rule depends on the maxim: the prohibition of every
 harmful act and the permission of every benefit. Then he reminds his
 reader that although in some cases offering such medals might be a
 benefit to the society, the current situation in Egypt being that gaining
 such medals means getting honorary titles in the government. This
 leads to the fact that people became obsessed with getting such medals
 even if they pay bribes. Therefore, Rid? concludes, the current use of
 such medals must be prohibited.72
 On the Permission to Eat the Slaughtered Animals
 of the People of the Book
 In fatw? 154, published in the Man?r, 1905, a Muslim from Singa
 pore informs Rid? that he received a book, written by an Egyptian and
 called al-Ta'ad?l al-Islamiyya, in which the author repudiates 'Abduhs
 fatw? on the permission to eat from the meat of animals slaughtered
 by the People of the Book.73 He then asks Rid? whether the Qur'?nic
 permission is conditioned on specific ways of slaughtering animals
 that were known during the time of the Prophet and were followed by
 the People of the Book at that time. Rid? responds first that the ques
 tion of eating the food of the People of the Book is not a "ta'abbud?"
 one (i.e. not considered fixed in form as a religious obligation similar
 toHb?d?t). He also observes that "nothing related to the details of the
 legal case that is attached to the spirit (ruh) of religion and its essence
 except the prohibition of offering a slaughtered animal to other than
 God, because this is one of the rituals of pagans and the rites of the
 71. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, p. 190.
 72. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, p. 266.
 73. The inquirer in Rid?'s fatw?, 154, also asks him whether 'Abduh permitted
 eating the meat of animals killed by violent blow (mawq?dha), which is prohib
 ited in Q. 5:3.
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 polytheists. Therefore, Muslims are prohibited from eating such ani
 mals or contributing to such practices. Rid? adds
 ? God wanted us to differentiate between polytheists and the
 People of the Book, and therefore He permitted their food for
 us without any condition, similarly to the permission to marry
 from them while Muslims are prohibited from marrying polythe
 ists. Thus the hikma of this permission is to have a good relation
 ship with the People of the Book and not because they slaughter
 their animals in a certain way. ?74
 It is clear that those jurists who objected to ?bduhs Transvaal fat
 w? 75 were arguing that although there is a Qur'?nic verse (5:5) which
 clearly permits eating the meat slaughtered by Christians and Jews, cur
 rent Christians and Jews do not slaughter their animals similar to what
 their ancestors did during the time of revelation, and consequently one
 should not eat from the food of contemporary Christians and Jews.
 Rid?, after reminding his readers of the Qur'?nic verse, argues that
 this verse is general in its meaning and we cannot condition its effect
 based on an assumption that the way in which past Christian and Jews
 slaughtered their animals was different from our contemporaries, and
 therefore we should not eat the meat offered by them. If such logic is
 true, Rid? argues, then we should look into every ruling of the sharVa
 and say that the permission or prohibition is conditioned by the way
 such a ruling was applied during the time of the Prophet. "Do we have
 to say, for example, that we should have a Friday prayer with an exactly
 similar mosque to that of the Prophet or a similar number of people
 attending the service?" As for the objection that 'Abdutis fatw? permits
 eating from the meat of an animal hacked to death (mawq?dha) by the
 People of the Book, a state of killing the animal that is prohibited in
 the Qur'?n, Rid? contends that Abduh's fatw? did not permit eating
 from the meat of such animals but on the general observation that the
 People of the Book in our time slaughter their animals before eating
 their meat. Rid? concludes that his argumentation on this question
 is supported by the evidence from the Qur'?n, sunna, and the deep
 understanding of the sharVa.76
 74. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, p. 353.
 75. For a detailed account of the criticism that Abduh faced after issuing his fatw?
 of permission, see C. C. Adams, "Muhammad Abduh and the Transvaal Fatwa",
 Macdonald Presentation, vol. 3, 1933, pp. 12-29.
 76. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, p. 354.
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 It is clear from the previous exposition of Rid?'s fatw? on the per
 mission to eat from the meat of animals slaughtered by Christians and
 Jews that he sees the intention of the Lawgiver regarding eating such
 meat of non-Muslims as similar to eating any other kind of food which
 does not have a religious component. The only religious prohibition
 is against eating from the meat offered to deities other than God. The
 fact that Qur'?nic texts prohibit eating only from such meat slaugh
 tered by polytheists without stating any prohibition of eating from the
 meat of their animals, if not offered to their deities, indicates clearly
 that eating meat is not different from eating other kinds of food ex
 cept for the obvious religious reason of sacrifice. The only exception to
 this general permission is to know that the animal was killed in a way
 prohibited in the Qur'?n, i.e. not slaughtered. Therefore, the reasoning
 behind Rid?'s argument is to focus on the purpose of the prohibition
 and the permission, although his argument follows the literal under
 standing of the Qur'?nic verse related to the People of the Book.
 On Making Statues and Paintings of Human and
 Animal Forms
 In more than one fatw?, Rid? was asked about the prohibition of mak
 ing statues and paintings of human and animal form in Islam.77 While
 Abduh dealt with this issue only in his articles describing his trip to
 Sicily,78 and therefore did not offer a sophisticated legal discourse on
 this legal question, Rid? in fatw? 547, published in the Man?r, 1917,
 engages in a very detailed treatment of the subject. After listing fif
 teen had?ths on the subject and then enumerating thirteen points on
 the opinions of early jurists regarding those had?ths, Rid? concludes
 with what he thinks is the main instructions in those had?ths. First,
 the musawwir?n (those who make statues or paintings of human and
 animal forms) will be chastised on the Day of Judgment and will be
 ordered to resurrect into life what they made because of their intent to
 challenge the creation of God by producing a similar form.79 Second,
 77. For the traditional Sunn? views on the subject, see al-jAZ?R?, Al-Fiqh 'Ala al
 Madh?hib al-Arbda (Beirut: Dar al-Thaqalayn, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 73-75.
 78. On ?bduh s view on the same question, see my article Muhammad 'Abduh
 and maq?sid al-shar?a, The Maghreb Review, Vol. 32, No 1, 2007, pp. 19-21.
 79. The Arabic word, used in those had?ths to denote the intention of statue mak
 ers, is yud?h?na. Some traditional jurists understand the meaning as "to make a
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 the musawwir is cursed in the had?th, like those who made the graves
 of their Prophets as places of worship to God. The had?th mentions
 that the latter people used to make statues and paintings of the pious
 among them and put them in their temples. They are described as the
 worst of creation. Third, it is prohibited to hang curtains that have
 such paintings, and must be torn apart or removed. Fourth, the rea
 soning behind the prohibition is mentioned in one had?th that "we are
 not obliged to make shapes from rocks and clay." In another had?th,
 Rid? adds, it is stated that paintings distract the Muslim who is mak
 ing prayer if they are located in front of him or her. It is also stated in
 a had?th that "the angels do not enter a house which has a statue or
 a dog." Fifth, one can also conclude from the had?th literature that it
 is permitted to wear clothes or have pillows that contain pictures of
 animal forms, and that the Prophet used such pillows, as in the had?th
 narrated by Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855).80 Sixth, changing the pic
 ture of an animal to make it similar to a tree by removing its head, for
 instance, will permit its use. Seventh, if there is any shape of a cross in
 a painting or a picture, it must be removed.81
 Rid? then states his conclusion that the reason for the expected
 severe punishment on the Day of Judgment for tasw?r is twofold: first
 due to an intent to challenge God's creation by having a similar one,
 and second to prevent the worshipping of statues of prophets and pi
 ous people, although the maker of such statues did not intend to do so.
 Thus, the second reason of the prohibition is based on sadd al-dhar?i .
 Rid? quotes Ibn Hajar al-Asqalan? (d. 852/1449) in the latter's com
 mentary on Bukhar?'s (d. 256/870) Sah?h, that the reason for the pro
 hibition of tasw?r is similar to those who were cursed by God because
 they built places of worship to God on the graves of their prophets,
 and later their posterity worshipped those graves. Ibn Hajar declares
 that the prohibition of having graves of pious people in mosques is
 based on sadd al-dhar?i', and if one is sure that there is no danger of
 worshipping such graves, then one can permit such practice. Rid? adds
 that applying the rule o? sadd al-dhar?i' differs from time to time and
 the kind of tasw?r existing. Because the statues, which were venerated
 similar creation." But for Rid? and other jurists, the verb has the connotation of
 intending to challenge God s creation.
 80. The reference here is to Ahmad b. Hanbal s al-Musnad (Cairo: Dar al-I'tisam,
 1974), vol. 2, p. 107.
 81. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, p. 1411.
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 before Islam to the level of worship, were of human and animal forms,
 the Companion Ibn Abb?s permitted the one who asked him about
 painting the shapes of trees to do so. But since the pictures that portray
 human and animal forms became used only for aesthetic reasons, and
 the possibility of worshipping them disappeared, some of the salaf
 (early fathers) put such pictures in their houses. However, Rid? ob
 serves, the possibility of worshipping pictures of prophets and saints
 is still valid, similarly to what some Muslims were doing at the tombs
 of venerated people. Rid? concludes that except for the prohibition of
 portraying prophets and venerated people, there is no harm in having
 statues and paintings of human and animal forms because there is no
 intention to sanctify certain people or animals by making statues and
 paintings, which later might become objects of worship. In fact, Rid?
 adds, there are many benefits from having such pictures such as know
 ing what animals and plants look like when listed in a dictionary, in
 the sciences of natural history, medicine, anatomy, and for military
 purposes. Moreover, modern governments need such pictures in their
 political and administrative activities.
 This fatw? shows that Rid?'s reasoning is very much based on his
 contemplation of the hikma of the legal rule pertaining to making stat
 ues and pictures of human and animal forms. If the practice leads to
 worshipping such works of art, then it must be prohibited. But since
 there is no intention by the artist to either challenge God's creation or
 offer such statues for people to worship, then Muslims are permitted
 to have such a practice, and in fact they are encouraged to do so if
 there are benefits for the Muslim community.82
 On Consuming Alcohol for Medical Reasons
 and its Use as a Component in Perfumes
 and Other Chemicals
 In fatw? 607, Rid? deals with questions addressed to him from In
 dia in which a muft?, named Muhammad Shaf?q al-Rahm?n, issued a
 fatw? prohibiting the use of alcohol for medical treatment.83 He also
 prohibited the use of any chemical, such as paints, in which alcohol is
 a component. His reasoning is based on a claim of consensus among
 82. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, p. 1417.
 83. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, pp. 1609-1634.
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 Muslim jurists that khamr is impure (najis), and consequently if any
 intoxicating material is used as a component in any chemical, the
 end product will be impure and hence cannot be used. This prohibi
 tion mostly applied to using chemicals that contain alcohol to paint
 mosques. The impurity of khamr, according to the Indian muft?, is
 mentioned in the Qur'?nic verse which prohibits the consumption of
 khamr by describing it as rijs, a term that denotes impurity.84 Rid?
 first rejects the claim of the consensus that khamr, whether made of
 grape wine or not, is physically an impure material. He contends with
 the Indian muft? that the term rijs in the Qur'?n does not refer only
 to khamr but also to gambling (maysir) among other prohibited prac
 tices. No one can say that there is a physical impurity in gambling
 but rather a moral impurity of the practice itself. This is true also for
 khamr. He mentions that the question of whether khamr is pure or
 impure is a matter of disagreement among Muslims jurists. But even
 with the assumption of impurity, adding an impure material to others
 does not make the end product necessarily impure. In fact, alcohol is
 used for cleaning and disinfecting and cannot be declared religiously
 impure, especially because it is different from khamr (i.e. fermented
 grape wine) in its chemical composition. What mostly relates to our
 purpose, however, is that Rid? looks into the reasons behind the pro
 hibition, which are declared in the Qur'?n as causing quarreling among
 Muslims and forgetting to remember God and the prayer (Q. 5:91).
 If the consumption o? khamr is intended for its effect of intoxication,
 then using a little amount for medical reasons, providing that there
 is no other medicine available, is permitted because this will not lead
 to intoxication and consequently to the negative effects mentioned in
 the Qur'?n. The same is true in using chemicals with alcoholic compo
 nents in paints and other materials.
 One can see that the hikma of the prohibition is taken into con
 sideration in Rid?'s reasoning. In juristic terms, Rid? argues that ma
 terials such as paints are not khamr because they do not intoxicate if
 consumed even if alcohol is a component of them, and therefore they
 are not included in the prohibition. As for alcohol in perfumes, it is
 treated in a way that if consumed, it might cause intoxication but also
 severe medical problems. It is thus not intended for consumption and
 cannot be regarded as khamr. For the case of using khamr for medi
 cal reasons, Rid? explains that it is a matter of disagreement among
 84. The reference here is to Q. 5:90.
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 jurists. It depends on whether one can regard such use as a case of
 necessity or not. Al-Shafi'?, for example, did not regard the case of a
 person dying from thirst as a necessity that allows him to drink wine
 to preserve his life similar to the permission to eat pork meat in such
 a case. Abu Han?fa permitted such action by considering it a case of
 necessity. Rid? quotes the Qur'?nic verse, "And He hath mentioned
 to you whatever He prohibited, except for what you do out of neces
 sity," to argue that any rule of prohibition in the sharVa can endure
 a case of necessity because the sharVa is based on easiness. On the
 question of the medical consumption of alcohol, Rid? reiterates his
 conviction that taking a medicine that has an alcoholic component
 is not intended for intoxication and does not lead to the harms of
 such consumption, mentioned in the Qur'?n. But if one takes large
 amounts of such medicines in order to be intoxicated, then this is
 definitely prohibited.85 Finally, Rid? draws on Shatib?'s Mu?faq?t to
 show that the sharVa aims at preserving the necessary masalih, which
 are the preservation of religion, life, honor, and property. According to
 this understanding, Rid? argues, the permission for having alcoholic
 drug for medication lies within the aim of preserving life in Islam. The
 other uses of materials that have an alcoholic component are permit
 ted based on Shatib?'s reference to the "needed" and "complimentary"
 masalih that the sharVa also aims to achieve.86
 On the Question of Bank Interest
 and the Prohibition of Usury
 Rid? received several questions about Abduh's/aiw? which apparently
 allowed taking interest in a savings account established through post
 offices in Egypt. According to many Muslim jurists, this transaction
 is prohibited because it is described as a usurious contract included
 in what the Qur'?nic prohibition called riba.87 Any guaranteed profit
 that does not have the possibility of loss is considered rib?, and there
 fore banned in Islamic law. Rid? responds to these questions by first
 85. See fatw? 6, Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, pp. 31-2.
 86. For more details on Shatib?'s triple system of masalih, see Muhammad Khalid
 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, pp. 5-15.
 87. For the definition of riba, as mentioned in the Qur'?n, see Frank E. Vogel,
 Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (The Hague: Kluwer Law
 International, 1998), pp. 62-3.
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 arguing that there are several conditions which medieval jurists put
 forward to validate contracts.88 These conditions should not be con
 sidered religious rulings (ta'abbud) but rather an interpretive effort
 based on ijtih?d. Thus, in order to determine the definition of rib?,
 one needs to look into the Qur'?nic injunctions first and foremost,
 then to Prophetic traditions that are sound and authoritative. Rid?
 quotes Tabar?'s (d. 310/923) commentary on the Qur'?n to argue that
 the Qur'?nic prohibition of the practice of rib? is precisely a prohibi
 tion of what is known as rib? al-j?hiliyya, a usurious practice that was
 dominant among Arabs before Islam. According to Tabar? and other
 sources, rib? al-j?hiliyya is a transaction through which a lender agrees
 to postpone the payment of a loan for the borrower, which already
 contains a profit for the lender, on the condition that the profit is
 substantially increased. This situation, argues Rid?, caused a serious
 economic problem for poor people because they could not repay their
 loans and they continued to be in debt for the rest of their lives. In
 juristic terms it is called rib? al-nas?'a.89 Rid? also quotes Ibn Qayyim
 al-Jawziyya in his Ham al-Muaqqi'?n, who argues that the prohibited
 rib? in the Qur'?n is rib? al-nas?'a. As for having a loan with an origi
 nal interest, this is called rib? al-fadl. According to Ibn al-Qayyim,
 this kind of contract is prohibited in Prophetic traditions not because
 of its essence as an invalid transaction but rather because its practice
 will lead into having rib? al-nas?'a. Thus, according to Ibn al-Qayyim,
 rib? al-fadl is prohibited based on the principle o? sadd al-dhar?i1. Ibn
 al-Qayyim concludes that whatever is prohibited in the sharVa for its
 own essence (muharram li-dhatih?) can be permitted only in case of
 absolute necessity (dar?ra). But whatever is prohibited based on sadd
 al-dhar?i, such as rib? al-fadl, can be permitted in cases of necessity
 and need (h?ja). That is why the Prophet permitted the sale of ar?y?
 despite its clear inclusion within rib? al-fadl.90
 Rid?, however, after referring to Ibn al-Qayyim's theorization, ad
 vances his own view based on his consideration of maq?sid al-shar?a.
 He argues that the hikma of the prohibition of rib? al-nas?'a in the
 Qur'?n is clearly mentioned in 2: 279. The injustice committed by
 one party against the other is the main reason for the prohibition of
 usurious contracts. The bank interest in a savings account does not
 88. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 2, pp. 596 ff., fatw? 230.
 89. See Vogel, Islamic Law and Finance, pp. 74-5.
 90. See Ibn al-QAYYiM, fl?m, vol. 2, pp. 15-17.
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 lead to injustice, which is mentioned in the Qur'?n as the reason for
 prohibiting usurious contracts. But the interest is still included within
 rib? al-fadl. This analysis leads Rid? to say that, based on Ibn al-Qayy
 im's theorization, if there is extreme need in modern Muslims societies
 to such transactions, they can be permitted based on the principle of
 h?ja. However, Rid? insists that Abduh's fatw? to legalize bank in
 terest on savings accounts was issued after Abduh asked the relevant
 authorities to invest the saved money in a legitimate business, and
 therefore the savings can be regarded as a form of investment and not
 a loan to the bank. Rid? adds that during the last few years of Abduh's
 career as Egypt's muft?, his relationship with the Khedive had deterio
 rated. The Khedive's supporters spread a rumor that Abduh has given
 a fatw? to legitimize rib? without mentioning his attempt to reform
 the bank system in a way that makes saving accounts totally legitimate
 in Islamic law.91
 On Accepting Evidence in Court Based on a
 Telegraphic Message
 In fatw? 98, Rid? received a question that inquired about the validity
 of using a telegraphic message as evidence in court.92 He replies first
 by declaring that most contemporary judges do not accept a statement
 of a witness in a lawsuit received through a telegraphic message, just
 as they do not accept written documents. Rather, they strictly require
 that witnesses must be present in person in front of the judge. Rid?
 then argues that "if we go back to the fundamentals of the Qur'?n,
 sunna, and the hikam of the sharVa, we know that evidence (bayyina)
 includes everything which helps to establish truth in a way that the
 judge trusts." He adds that the current government sends telegraphic
 messages on a continuous basis to their agents as a way of instruction.
 Merchants make deals with each other through such messages. This
 is a clear proof that it is considered a trusted way of communication.
 Therefore, it should be included within judicial practices.
 91. See fatw? 526, Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, pp. 1340-42.
 92. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 1, pp. 228-9.
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 On Listening to Singing and Playing Musical
 Instruments
 Rid? received several questions in his fatw?s section of the Man?r about
 the legality of singing and playing musical instruments. Many tradi
 tionalist jurists strictly prohibited singing, especially if accompanied
 by musical instruments. The prohibition is based on several had?ths
 and on traditions of early religious authorities. In fatw? 185, Rid? first
 enlists most of the had?ths and early traditions about the case.93 He
 then concludes that the number of sound had?ths that permit sing
 ing is actually larger than those prohibiting the practice. But even if
 there are some sound had?ths that prohibit singing and playing musical
 instruments, this is because such practices were associated, during the
 time of the Prophet, with drinking wine and committing great sins. He
 quotes in his fatw? Ghazz?lfs Ihy?', in which the latter's reasoning is
 similar to that of Rid?. Ghazzal? argues that "the reason for prohibiting
 the use of certain musical instruments, such as the'wd and mizm?r, is
 because they were associated with the gatherings of drinking wine. On
 the contrary, tabl and duff were permitted in the had?th because they
 were mostly used during weddings." Ghazzal? continues his argumen
 tation by noting that "God has permitted every good thing (tayyib?t)
 except if the permission leads to mischief. The sounds played by musi
 cal instruments are not prohibited to listen to because of their quality
 as musical intonations. If this is the case, then listening to the singing
 of birds must be prohibited. The prohibition, therefore, has to be for
 other reasons, which is the association with gatherings in which great
 sins are committed." Rid? depends on Ghazz?lfs analysis to argue that
 if the use of any kind of musical instruments is not associated with
 sinful actions, then there is no harm in permitting listening to singing
 and music, on the condition that it should not lead to indulgence that
 affects one's remembrance of God or his/her recitation of the Qur'?n.
 Rid? concludes that "every action that is harmful to religion, mind,
 self, property, or honor is prohibited, and there is no prohibited ac
 tion that is not harmful."94 It is clear that Rid?'s fatw?, and his legal
 interpretation of singing and music, reflects his interest in considering
 the reasoning behind the prohibition and consequently deciding the
 application of the legal rule accordingly.
 93. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 2, p. 474.
 94. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 2, p. 493.
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 On the Dissolution of a Marriage Contract due
 to Previously Unknown Mental or Physical Defect
 in the Husband or Wife
 In fatw? 539, Rid? replies to a question concerning a matter of disa
 greement among the Sunn? schools of jurisprudence.95 The question is,
 if the newly married husband or wife discover that his/her partner suf
 fers from an illness such as a skin disease or insanity, can the contract
 be dissolved accordingly? The jurists agree that if there is a condition,
 related to the physical appearance or health of the wife, for example,
 which is stated in the contract, then the husband has the right to dis
 solve the contract. But if there is no stated condition in the contract,
 and after the conclusion of it, a defect appeared in the husband or
 the wife, then the disagreement is on the legality of invalidating the
 contract through divorce. For Z?hirite jurists, such as D?w?d al- Zahir?
 (d. 270/884) and Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), the contract cannot be dis
 solved because there is no clear Qur'?nic text or a had?th which permits
 such an action. The Hanafites and Sh?fi'ites each included only spe
 cific defects and not others. The established hanbalite opinion includes
 more possible health problems than both the hanafites and Sh?fi'ites
 but is also limited to a specific number. The reasoning behind the
 disagreement is that the evidence mainly comes from opinions of the
 Companions and whether one can make qiy?s to add more defects or
 health problems to the list. However, the enquirer who addressed the
 question to Rid? was concerned about whether one can also include
 diseases and permanent health problems that have become well-known
 and documented in modern medicine but were not known to medieval
 jurists. Rid?'s view is that the narrated traditions from the Compan
 ions or the Successors, related to the case in question, are based on
 the main principles of the sharVa, such as the prevention of deception
 and negating the acceptance of harming oneself or others (l? dorar wa
 l? dir?r). Therefore, Rid? observes, there is no reason to limit the de
 fects to specific instances. What is interesting in this/a?w? is that Rid?
 quotes Ibn al-Qayyim's Z?d al-Md?d in which the latter explains that
 ? any kind of defect which leads the husband or the wife to stay
 away from the other, and with its presence the aim (maqs?d) of
 95. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, pp. 1370-76. For traditional views on the subject, see
 Ibn Qudama, Mughni, vol. 9, pp. 471 ff.
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 marriage, which is the mercy and love between them, will not be
 achieved, is considered a legitimate reason for the dissolution of
 the contract. Whoever contemplates maq?sid al-sharta through
 its sources and finds justice, wisdom (hikma), and the considera
 tion of masalih, would definitely realize that this opinion (on the
 specific question) is the one that is based on the fundamentals of
 the s har?a. ? 96
 There are other examples o? fatw?s in which Rid?'s opinions largely
 depend on interpretations of texts or traditions in a way that focus
 on the role o? maq?sid al-shar?a, such as his opinions on slavery, po
 lygamy, war and peace, and political consultation in Islam. But these
 are explained previously in the section on maq?sid al-Qur'?n of Rid?'s
 al-Wahy al-Muhammad?.
 As for cases that are not governed by or related to Qur'?nic verses
 or Prophetic traditions, there are several fatw?s in which Rid? ap
 plies the principle of "bringing benefits and preventing harm." It all
 depends on whether an action is considered of benefit to the Muslim
 community or not. The guiding principle for Rid?, as stated before,
 is that in mu amal?t every action or practice is considered valid un
 less proved to be harmful. In such a case of harm, a prohibition can
 be declared but is not considered a religious one. A clear example
 of Rid?'s prohibition of an action, based on its harmful effect, is his
 opinion on smoking and consuming drugs such as morphine. He
 declares in fatw? 576 that in matters related to drinking and eating,
 everything that God created is permitted for use except those stated
 in the Qur'?n or sunna. There are no texts that rule specifically on
 smoking cigarettes or injecting morphine to the body. But a jurist can
 depend on the general principles of the sharVa, such as the one stated
 in the had?th "l? darar wa l? dir?r," that whatever action that causes
 harm to the body must be prohibited.97
 Conclusion
 This article has analyzed Rid?'s conception of maq?sid al-shar?a by
 examining his theoretical works and some of his fatw?s in order to see
 how his line of thought is compared to traditional theorization and
 96. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, p. 1374.
 97. Rid?, Fat?w?, vol. 4, pp. 1546-1547.
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 legal opinions of Sunn? Muslim jurists. I argue in this article that Rid?'s
 emphasis on maslaha is a component of his understanding of the legal
 aims intended by the Lawgiver. His conception of maq?sid al-shar?a
 stems from his interpretation of the Qur'?nic text. This interpretation
 is very much free from the limitation of traditional commentaries but
 it is committed to the linguistic content of the Qur'?n. If the Qur'?nic
 text explains itself clearly without heavy dependence on extra-Qur'?nic
 material, including Prophetic traditions, then one has to focus more
 on the idea of how the Qur'?n interprets itself. Here, Rid? resorts to
 the "thematic" method in which all or most of the verses that pertain
 to a specific topic can be collected and analyzed in a way that seeks
 harmony among their meanings. But despite the primacy of the Qur'?n
 at the expense of other legal sources, Rid?'s legal theorization allows a
 secondary role for Prophetic traditions and other levels of scholarly tra
 ditions. It is worth noting that Rid? reminds his readers that the juristic
 schools disagreed on the question of the revelatory nature of Prophetic
 traditions. However, Rid? does not clearly announce his position, al
 though he calls for applying all sound had?ths by virtue of their prob
 able authenticity but insists on their secondary role to the Qur'?n.
 This article, therefore, responds to the claim made by Kerr and Hal
 laq that the focus on maslaha in Rid?'s legal thought is in fact a point
 of departure from traditional legal theorization in which Rid?'s legal
 interpretation becomes more "distant" from the texts of the Qur'?n and
 had?th. This has been done in two ways according to Kerr and Hallaq.
 First, in the legal cases that are regulated by textual rulings, the literal
 meaning and legal value of the text are ignored for the favor of necessity
 and need. Second, for the novel cases that have no ruling in the Qur'?n
 or had?th, ijm?' and qiy?s are suspended and maslaha is elevated to
 become the prominent source instead. My response to Kerr and Hal
 laq's line of theorization is expressed in this article on two levels, textual
 and non-textual. On the textual level, I have argued that Rid?'s focus
 on the legal content of Qur'?nic and had?th texts reflects his interest in
 the legal aims or the maq?sid of the rulings as part of the maq?sid of
 the Qur'?n. Necessity and need come into the discussion only when
 interpreting Qur'?nic verses that clearly allow for taking necessity and
 need into consideration. Rid? views this resort to the case of necessity
 or need as part of maq?sid al-shar?a. Rid? bases his view on some
 medieval juristic opinions that generalized the principle of necessity to
 possibly include cases of prohibition not mentioned in the Qur'?n as
 suspended for the existence of necessity such as eating forbidden food.
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 Rid?'s fatw? that legitimizes using alcoholic drug for medication, for
 instance, is based on the principle of necessity. Deciding the existence
 of necessity is based on Rid?'s assessment that there is no non-alcoholic
 medication available and the fact that one of the primary legal aims of
 the sharVa is to preserve life. As for Rid?'s view on slavery, he sees the
 Qur'?n as encouraging freeing slaves and hence expressing the spirit of
 Islam, which is to free slaves.
 As for the area of legal activity that is not governed by texts, I tried
 to show that although maslaha is prominent in Rid?'s interpretation,
 its legitimacy stems from Qur'?nic verses that call for the consideration
 of maslaha in the sense that in mu amal?t, the aim of the Lawgiver is
 to achieve the public good. In terms of the commitment to the classi
 cal doctrines of legal theorization, Rid?'s line of thought against ijma
 and qiy?s is based on his view that there are no clear Qur'?nic or had?th
 references to the commitment to the scholarly consensus or analogy
 as the only two legal sources after the Qur'?n and had?th. In addition,
 he finds in his reading of the Qur'?n a clear call to consider the public
 good which is described as whatever brings benefit to individuals and
 the community at large and prevent harm and danger. The highest
 legal aims in Rid?'s theorization are taken from Shatib?, which are the
 preservation of religion, life, mind, offspring, and honor. Other inter
 mediate aims that lead to the final aims include justice and equality.
 As for the case of interest on saving accounts, Rid? interprets Ab
 duh's fatw? of permission as based on hoja (need) and not dar?ra (ne
 cessity). It is important to know that although Rid?'s legal theoriza
 tion might not be clearly expressed in classical Sunn? theorization, he
 is committed to the general meanings of the Qur'?nic text. He also
 argues that even isolated hadiths in mu amal?t ought to be applied if
 they have sound chains of authorities but on the condition first that
 they should not contradict the Qur'?n, and second that the applica
 tion itself must achieve the public good based on the evidence from
 Qur'?nic and had?th texts that call for this consideration and regard it
 as part o? maq?sid al-shar?a. This understanding gives Rid? the right
 to challenge certain traditional views based on what he thinks of as the
 spirit of revelation.
 Yasir S. Ibrahim
 (Montclair State University)
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